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Economic restructuring in the transition from plan to market concerns the
way enterprises try to achieve competitive advantage. Therefore, enter-
prises have to decide where to compete, that is to say with which prod-
uct they should enter which markets, and how to compete, that is by
which strategy they could succeed.
During the seven years since unification, the eastern German economy
has undergone considerable structural changes. However, the outcome
is a poor market specialization: industries which sell their products
mainly in local markets have remarkably increased their share in total
output, while industries producing for world-wide markets have lost im-
portance. Sailing into the safe harbour of local markets may be the need
of the moment for many companies. But it is a dangerous strategy. In the
long run, it may prove to be a trap without any escape.
The paper provides a selective and interpretative account of the restruc-
turing process in eastern German manufacturing. It starts with the given
constraints — exchange rate and wage convergence — which constitute
the wrong model for opening up a closed economy. It presents some
stylized facts revealing a strong vertical differentiation between eastern
and western German producers — with respect to product quality and
product markets as well as with respect to technological and organiza-
tional environment. As a result, the division of labour between the east-
ern German economy and the rest of the world tends to be an inter-in-
dustry type rather than an intra-industry one. Finally, the paper turns to
the key policy question of how to overcome these difficulties. It scruti-
nizes the main arguments for and against government's trade promotion
towards eastern German enterprises (P 52).I Introduction: Still Unequal Twins
Eight years after the collapse of the communist system in the eastern
part of Germany, it has become clear that the transformation of a whole
economy from plan to market is a mixture of success and failure.
Accordingly, the process of Germany's economic unification is full of
contradictions. On the one hand, eastern Germany's economic revival is
impressive by any standards. Convergence with western Germany's
economy has proceeded as a result of a very rapid growth of the capital
stock. On the other hand, it has not proceeded fast enough: average la-
bour productivity is hardly more than half of the western German level in
aggregate, whereas the process of wage convergence is more ad-
vanced, with eastern wages at almost three-quarters of western wages.
Burdened with excessive (unit) labour costs, only a minority of eastern
German companies is already able to compete successfully in interna-
tional markets. Export quotas are on average not even half as high as for
western German companies, and their contribution to overall foreign
sales is only in the range of 2.5 to 3 percent, which is very modest con-
sidering the share of eastern Germany in overall German population of
around 20 percent (Table 1).
The paper was prepared for a planned conference "Market Economy and Privati-
zation Experience" organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Cairo. Re-
search was undertaken with support from the European Commission's Phare ACE
Programme 1995 ..Emerging Market Organization and Corporate Restructuring in
Central and Eastern Europe", project no. 94-0590-R. I would like to thank my col-
leagues Katja Gerling and Birgit Sander for valuable research inputs and Wolf-




Gross domestic product per
employed person
Gross wage and salary per
employee
Unit labour costs
Net wage and salary per
employee
Note:
Gross output of manufacturing
Export of manufacturing











































Source: Central Statistical Office of the FRG.
Even hard-boiled optimists must concede that things do not proceed as
well as they might. Until now, the east and the west are still unequal
twins — each of them endowed with different hereditary factors and dif-
ferent physical strength. The most outstanding difference is: while the
western German economy is highly integrated into the world economy
which alternates with the United States in the position of the world's
champion, the eastern German economy suffers from an extremely poor
export market specialization: industries which sell their products mainly
in local markets dominate the pattern of production and have even in-
creased their share in total output. Industries producing for world-wide
markets, in contrast, are of minor and decreasing importance. This is not
only the legacy of the past: of the strategy of import substitution which
caused a distorted industry specialization and foreign trade orientation
towards the former COMECON. It is also an indication that something
goes wrong in the transformation process in eastern Germany. Certainly,
sailing into the safe harbour of local markets may be the need of the mo-ment for many companies. But it is a dangerous course. In the long run,
it may prove to be a trap without any escape.
The paper provides a selective and interpretative account of the restruc-
turing process in eastern German manufacturing. It starts with the given
constraints — exchange rate and wage convergence — which actually
constitute the wrong model for opening up a closed economy. Then it
presents some stylized facts highlighting the competitive weakness of
eastern German companies in international markets. Finally, it turns to
the key policy question of how to overcome the difficulties.
II Theoretical Background: Exchange Rate and Wage
Convergence: The Wrong Model for Opening-Up a Closed
Economy
The eastern German economy, like all Soviet-type economies, displayed
well-known deficiencies throughout its history:
• One was the distorted specialization of companies towards the re-
quirements of the COMECON rather than towards those of the
world market. Trade with the western world had more or less the
function of a "stopgap" for financing necessary imports of raw mate-
rials and technology — at what costs soever.
• Another was the poor competitiveness of companies in international
markets due to technological backwardness. An indication is the
implicit exchange rate between the GDR-Mark and the D-Mark
which was 3.8:1 in 1989. On average, exporting companies couldjust cover their costs at this rate.
2 However, there were enormous
differences between industries: in the electronics industry, e.g., the
rate was 7:1.
As Balassa [1982] demonstrated with reference to developing countries,
trade liberalization in post-communist countries should start with a de-
preciation of their currencies. This was precisely the kind of strategy that
most of the Central and East European countries have tried to pursue
from the beginning, making a great part of the production capacities
competitive in terms of international standards. As a result, these coun-
tries were very successful in redirecting their exports from eastern to
western markets [Landesmann and Szekely 1995].
In contrast, the opening-up of eastern Germany started with the wrong
model — an appreciation of the currency. When the German Economic,
Monetary and Social Union (GEMSU) was implemented between east-
ern and western Germany on 1 July 1990, all current payments (includ-
ing price and wage contracts) were converted from GDR-Mark into
D-Mark at a rate of 1:1 and all stocks (including outstanding claims and
liabilities) at a rate of 2:1. It was calculated that the conversion rate for
current transactions came equal to an average appreciation of the
2
It would be misleading, however, to assess the competitiveness of eastern Ger-
man producers according to the implicit exchange rate (which was called 'Rich-
tungskoeffizient
1 in the GDR terminology). At the given implicit exchange rate, only
a small fraction of goods and services could find their way to western markets.
Furthermore, given the state of autarky, none of the companies had to compete at
this rate with western companies in domestic markets.GDR-Mark of 4:1. This brought most companies from one day to the
other into the red. According to a rough calculation by Akerlof et al.
[1991], only 8 percent of industrial companies were still competitive in
international markets after GEMSU.
In addition, GEMSU was also a signal for a rapid adjustment of wages.
From spring 1990 to spring 1992 standard wages (per hour) nearly dou-
bled and by now, they have reached about 75 percent of the western
German rates. Thus, wage increases completely decoupled from the
companies' ability to bear the resulting cost burden. As a result, there
was a strong pressure to cut costs by firing workers. Within the first two
years, more than half of eastern Germany's industrial labour force lost
their jobs.
It is evident that the modalities of unification made enormous fiscal
transfers from western to eastern Germany necessary. From the begin-
ning, a wide range of government support schemes was established in
order to prevent companies from collapsing or to give incentives for re-
structuring them, to improve the infrastructure and, last but not least, to
finance job creation programmes and social transfers. The crucial prob-
lem is that the lion's share is devoted to compensating for wage in-
creases and to financing unemployment rather than to rebuilding the
capital stock. It is estimated that roughly two thirds of total transfers are
used for consumptive purposes.
3
On the one side, companies benefited from lower tax rates, better depreciation
allowances and investment subsidies and, above all, lower costs for inputs of
goods up to 60 percent of their resource costs — so the implicit exchange rate
was reduced from 3.73 to 1.84. On the other side, their earnings per unit of output
declined by even more than their input prices due to their low quality of products
etc. which raised the rate back to 3.84.Figure 1 - Relative Price Change and Structural Change in a Two-
Factor Model of the Eastern German Economy Before and
After GEMSU
T /
'GDRThe high consumptive transfers have created serious consequences for
the emerging structural pattern of the eastern German economy. It is a
strong incentive for investors to engage in industries producing for local
markets rather than for export markets. In other words: the massive con-
sumptive transfers have caused immense allocative distortions which
can be labelled — in analogy to the well-known Dutch disease phe-
nomenon — the "eastern German disease".
The situation before and after GEMSU can best be illustrated in the
framework of a Salter-Swan-Meade diagram.
4 It is assumed that the
economy produces two goods — tradables (7) and non-tradables (A/7).
The production possibilities are defined by the transformation curve, the
allocation by the structure of relative prices.
• As usual in a socialist economy, the price structure of the eastern
German economy was heavily distorted in favour of tradables. Thus,
the transition to a market economy led to a pronounced shift of the
price vector to PEG: the prices for tradables decreased because they
are determined by the world market, while the prices for non-trad-
ables increased because they are determined by domestic resource
costs and local demand conditions. As a result, the production pos-
sibilities frontier receded, visualized by a downward shift of the
transformation curve. It is evident that this shift was more pro-
nounced in the tradables sector being heavily affected by competi-
tion from abroad than in the non-tradables sector.
This was also used by Greiner, MaaB and Sell [1994], Naujoks [1993], Klodt and
Stehn [1994] and Sell [1996].• The downward shift of the transformation curve would have implied
a conversion rate of less than 1:1, say 1:4 as it was suggested by
the implicit exchange rate, in order to bring the consumption possi-
bilities of easterners in line with production possibilities. However,
due to the sharp wage increase, consumption possibilities increased
considerably which is illustrated by a move of the budget point aGDR
to a'EG- Since demand exceeded supply, eastern Germany's balance
of trade ran into a huge deficit, which had to be financed by transfer
payments from western Germany — the line between aEG and a'EG
on the Engel curve gives a description of the amount of fiscal
transfer necessary to close the gap between consumption and pro-
duction.
• As a result of huge fiscal transfers from west to east, the resource
allocation shifted once again from tradables to non-tradables pro-
ducing sectors: since prices for tradables are determined by the
world market, the increase in consumptive demand affected only the
prices for non-tradables, illustrated by an additional shift of the vec-
tor of relative prices from P'EG to P"EG-
It is important to understand that the shift from tradables to non-trad-
ables, in terms of output and employment, has been by far no zero-sum
game for the eastern German economy. In the short run, it has even
been a negative-sum game. Since the weight of tradables is much
higher than the weight of non-tradables, transfers have mainly raised
imports of tradables from abroad rather than have stimulated output of
tradables.Ill Stylized Facts: Non-Tradables Beat Tradables — The Eastern
German Disease
Economic restructuring in the transition from plan to market concerns the
way companies try to achieve competitive advantage. Defining their
strategy, companies first have to decide
• where, that is to say with which products and in which markets, they
should compete, and
• how, that is by which strategy, they could succeed [Gerling and
Schmidt 1997].
Principally, competitive advantages may be based either on product dif-
ferentiation defined by specialization (e.g., on high quality, exclusive
product design, selected distribution channels) or on cost-leadership
(low production and distribution costs achieved, e.g., by rationalization of
the manufacturing system, pursuing economies of scale, training of staff
or improving of quality control). Clearly, product differentiation and cost
leadership can also be attained at the same time.
The development of competitive advantages has been the subject of
many publications [Day 1984; Porter 1985]. However, these are mostly
concentrated on theoretical considerations. Empirical studies are rare.
The crucial point is that the determinants of competitive advantages are
difficult to operationalize. In particular, the influence of qualitative
characteristics such as product quality and design, brand image, reliabil-
ity of delivery or after sales service can hardly be studied on a global
level. Due to data constraint the following analysis concentrates on three
variables: sectoral specialization, spatial market penetration and vertical
integration.10
1 Sectoral Specialization
Western companies show a strong product specialization in accordance
with their comparative advantages. On a global level, this is defined by
the given factor endowment, resp. factor prices. As (western) Germany
ranks at the top of the technology frontier, its companies have held a
strong position in the markets for products with highly-skilled labour in-
tensity. In a competitive market environment, the given industry structure
can be considered as a rough measure for competitiveness. Conse-
quently, the deviation from the 'normal pattern' (which is supposed to be
the present industry structure of western Germany) can be used as an
indicator for the relative performance.
Therefore, one important aspect of the catching-up process of the east-
ern German manufacturing sector is to find a specialization pattern as to
products and markets which is in accordance with its comparative ad-
vantages. It is well-known that in the socialist economy this pattern was
heavily distorted. In this context, it is astonishing to see that the sectoral
specialization in the field of manufactures on an aggregated level did not
show significant differences in the GDR compared to the specialization
of the manufacturing sector in the FRG. In addition, changes in the
sectoral structure in eastern Germany after unification were relatively
small and developed in a parallel way as to western Germany (Table 2).
5
This was shown by Schmidt and Naujoks [1993]. However, from this one cannot
conclude that both specialization patterns were more or less identical. The GDR
production structure was biased in favour of poor product design and quality, low
productivity and high resource costs. In fact, there was a significant — vertical —
differentiation.11
However, a closer look at the figures on the two-digit level reveals some
interesting structural development patterns:
• Whereas the shares of most industries producing intermediate
goods and consumer non-durables increased or remained stable,
those of some industries producing capital goods fell. The most
striking feature is the collapse of the machinery industry, once the
showcase of GDR industries. This type of dualism can be explained
by the special German way of transformation, which pushed the
decline of industries producing goods saleable in international mar-
kets and the revival of industries serving mainly local markets
[Gerling and Schmidt 1997].
• Whereas the shares of most industries producing human capital-in-
tensive goods declined or remained unchanged, those of most in-
dustries producing fixed capital-intensive goods increased remark-
ably. Huge investment subsidies encouraged building up large
modern fixed capital-intensive capacities, in particular in the refin-
ery, chemical and road vehicle industries. These industries caught
up rapidly.
A special case is the favourable development of construction-related in-
dustries such as glass, pottery and mineral products or metal products
(which in the NACE classification includes steel construction). This can
be explained with the building boom in eastern Germany which, how-
ever, has surpassed its peak by now.12
Table 2 - Structure of Gross Output of Eastern and Western German
Manufacturing
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Source: Gorzig and Noack [1996].
All in all, the sectoral adjustment of the eastern German manufacturing
industry is far from coming to an end. The congruence on the aggregate
level conceals a strong vertical differentiation between eastern andiuuurnejc
(SOS Institute fur Weltwirtschoft
 1
3
western German producers — with respect to product quality and prod-
uct markets as well as with respect to technological and organizational
environment. The division of labour corresponds to an inter-industry type
rather than an intra-industry one. However, as wage rates will equalize,
one has to expect a strong pressure towards an upward movement
ending up in an intra-industry specialization. Thus, the hopes have to be
pinned on a few promising branches — namely the car industry and the
microelectronics industry — which started to establish highly productive
and innovative production centres in several eastern German regions.
2 Spatial Market Penetration
A second criterion with respect to specialization is how enterprises de-
fine the spatial dimension of their markets. On the basis of this criterion,
enterprises can serve local, regional, national or international markets.
Usually, they may tend to concentrate their activities on home markets
which are near to them geographically. In home markets, transaction
and transportation costs are lower and competitive pressure is weaker
than in foreign markets. However, in home markets, sales potential is
limited by size of the resident population and their purchasing power.
Therefore, acting in an international context should be a strategic target
for companies.
An outstanding feature of eastern German companies is their concentra-
tion on local and regional markets. Foreign markets still play a subordi-
nate role (Table 3). Only in a few branches, eastern German companies
have managed to offer a product range which is in line with international
preferences. Among these are in particular light industries such as food,
textiles and clothing, but not the traditionally export-orientated capital14
goods industries, which obviously have not yet got over the breakdown
of eastern European markets.
Table 3 - Export Quota
3 of Eastern and Western German
Manufacturing
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Source: Gorzig and Noack [1996].
Information from a firm panel reveals that half of the overall turnover was
realized nearby or somewhere else in eastern Germany in 1995
(Table 4). Another third was attained in western Germany. In recent
years, there has been a shift in regional sales structures in favour of
western German markets, but not in favour of international markets.15
These figures indicate that a competitive export base has not yet been
established. To a certain extent, this might reflect the suboptimal size
and branch structure of eastern German manufacturing: the very high
share of smaller firms and branches not producing for supra-regional
markets. But this might also express a lack of competitiveness which
makes itself felt on international markets rather than on local markets.
Table 4 - Regional Distribution of Turnover of Eastern German
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Vertical supplier and deliverer relationships can also affect competitive-
ness in international markets. In recent years, many companies incorpo-
rated themselves into networks serving as component producers or as-
semblers of final goods. The direct gains from this strategy result from a
finer division of labour, which lowers production costs through speciali-
zation.
The socialist combines, in contrast, were extremely vertically integrated
'production units', producing most of their inputs inside. When they were
split up in eastern Germany, the new firms started to optimize their
value-adding chain. Two contrasting kinds of changes occurred:
• First, they began to purchase more inputs, replacing parts of inside
production. By that, the share of value added in gross output de-
creased.
• Second, they began to restructure their production, replacing low-
value-adding activities by high-value-adding activities. This way, the
share of value added in gross output increased.
In the early stage, as a result of the splitting-up of combines, the first ef-
fect was predominant. The share of value added in gross output fell
dramatically, revealing, however, the poor performance of most of the
companies rather than an advanced restructuring process according to
the western example. Meanwhile, this share increased again: from
14 p.c. in 1991 to almost 20 p.c. in 1994 (Table 5). Nevertheless, it is on
average still considerably lower than in western Germany. Only in a few
branches, the net production quota almost reached or even surpassed
the western German level (refinery, paper and pulp processing, printing).17
Interestingly, the gap narrowed in basic goods and consumer goods in-
dustries, not so much in capital goods industries.
Table 5 - Share of Value Added
3 in Gross Output in Eastern and
Western German Manufacturing
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 bEnterprises with 20 and more employees only. taxes less
Source: Central Statistical Office of the FRG.18
The low share of value added also reflects the unfavourable cost struc-
ture of eastern German companies.
• Material consumption in relation to gross output decreased only
marginally since 1991. In 1994, it still exceeded the quota of west-
ern German companies by 16 percentage points (Table 6). This
cannot be explained by the dominance of material-intensive indus-
tries. On the contrary, a rough calculation shows that the quota
would be even higher if eastern Germany had the same structure of
production as western Germany. The main reason is that many
eastern German plants are operating as 'prolonged workbenches' of
western German companies. They frequently perform relatively
simple production steps creating only a low value added, such as
assembling or refining, which imply high shares of material supply.
• Energy consumption, although decreasing in relation to gross output
between 1991 and 1994, is also still higher than in western German
companies. This is mainly due to the energy-intensive production
structure within industries: the chemicals industry in eastern Ger-
many, e.g., is an important supplier of mass-produced articles such
as primary products, fertilizers, lacquers and plastics while in west-
ern Germany, it is rather a supplier of sophisticated products, in
particular of Pharmaceuticals.
• Finally, depreciations on fixed capital and interest payments for
outside capital are almost twice as high as those of western Ger-
man companies. This is the consequence of the modern capital
equipment established in recent years.19
The unfavourable cost structure of eastern German companies must be
partly ascribed to the low capacity utilization. Most of the cost catego-
ries, except material consumption, are fixed costs. Unit costs tend to de-
crease with the increase of output and sales. However, the unfavourable
cost structure is also an impediment to increasing sales. Therefore,
companies are trapped: a higher capacity utilization could lower their
costs, but without lower costs, a higher capacity utilization is hardly
achievable.
Table 6 - Share of Selected Costs in Gross Output in Eastern and
Western German Manufacturing
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Source: Central Statistical Office of the FRG.
IV Policy Conclusions: How to Widen the Export Base of
Economies in Transition
There is a general lesson to be learned for the process of restructuring:
quick privatization and heavy subsidization are not enough to guarantee
an immediate success in the hunt for market shares on a global level.
Establishing a firm position in nation-wide and international markets ob-20
viously requires some competition experience which can only be gained
with time. As stated above, entering international markets is a stepwise
process and the state cannot force it by granting high financial support.
Money cannot buy everything, various things need time.
The key policy question is how to overcome these difficulties. In princi-
ple, there are two possibilities:
• First: the government could stop all consumptive transfers to east-
ern Germany. This would bring, as can be derived from a Salter-
Swan-Meade diagram, consumption possibilities of easterners in
line with output possibilities and — as a result — change the relative
prices and the allocation in favour of tradables. In addition, trade
unions could agree to a substantial cut in real wages in export
industries. This would improve the competitiveness of these indus-
tries and give more incentives to invest. It is evident that there is no
realistic chance for implementing such a strategy.
• Second: the government could concentrate its support on tradables
producing industries — on companies operating in supra-regional
markets. Accordingly, many German economists and policy makers
are in favour of prioritizing companies in the "export sector", which
might include many branches of the manufacturing industry, but also
some branches of producer-related services. The crucial point is: it
is virtually impossible to accurately identify companies constituting
the export basis of a region according to operational criteria. Fre-
quently, "local players" are important links to export chains as was
shown in the literature on so-called industrial districts.21
The issue of export promotion is of general interest for economies in
transition. It is true that these economies are very poorly integrated in-
ternationally although they are supposed to possess a huge potential for
cross-border trade, contracting and investment. Therefore, it is argued
that governments should have a strong commitment to provide large-
scale support such that cross-border activities can flourish. This raises
the question: what can governments really do and how should they do it?
Does export promotion really make sense? Or are efforts to promote or
sell companies' exports only a new form of the old mercantilism as was
recently asserted by The Economist [1997]? In principle, things are clear
for an economist:
• Governments should encourage all companies to exploit their op-
portunities in international markets. They should do so by conduct-
ing a liberal open-market policy, in particular, by ensuring free flow
of goods and capital. In this way, all companies in all countries
would benefit.
• Governments, however, should be kept out of the market and
should be entrusted only with providing a sound regulatory frame-
work. They should support the market forces and should not work
against them. In particular, they should avoid
inducing companies to undertake cross-border activities which
are beyond their reach and may be unprofitable,
influencing business strategies with regard to products, target
markets, forms of integration and location of activities,
raising companies' "competitiveness" by granting subsidies,
- making enterprises dependent on support.22
Government support for internationalization — like most government in-
terventions — may do much harm by generating severe market distor-
tions rather than do some good by correcting market or policy failures.
In a well-working market economy, one can trust that markets ensure the
optimal allocation of resources. Accordingly, companies can be expected
to link the international division of labour according to their comparative
advantages and to develop an adequate degree and adequate modes of
internationalization. Notwithstanding, it is true that companies in transi-
tion economies — as compared to companies in western-style market
economies — are less internationally integrated and that they prefer
shallow integration, largely through arm's-length transactions. This by it-
self is not necessarily a sign of market failures but rather reflects that
companies in transition economies generally have specific disadvan-
tages in international markets like restricted access to information and
limited branding capabilities. In the absence of economies of scale due
to small plant size, they also suffer from higher production costs. How-
ever, these size-related impediments are market imperfections rather
than market failures. Government action should accept them when
steering companies' internationalization and not attempt to neutralize
them.
Markets can fail in ensuring companies' optimal internationalization,
though. The sources of market failures that may justify government in-
tervention include:
• Lacking private supply of public goods, e.g., when markets fail to
supply basic infrastructure.
• Inefficient market structures, e.g., when markets are monopolized.23
• Imperfect or asymmetric information, e.g., when some information is
not available to all agents or some agents have more rapid access
to information than others.
• Risk aversion, e.g., when financial institutions refuse to fund high-
risk though potentially high-return projects.
• Adjustment lags, e.g., when the markets adjust too slowly to internal
or external shocks.
Market failures translate into risk from which companies in transition
economies suffer relatively more frequently than companies in western-
style market economies.
However, most deficiencies identified in international business do not fall
into these categories. More often, companies have to deal with govern-
ment failures causing market distortions. This is the case if governments
impose or fail to remove
• restrictions on trade and investment,
• regulations in commodity and financial markets,
• exchange-rate controls,
• high tax rates and double taxation,
• public or publicly tolerated private monopolies.
Clearly, similar to market failures, companies suffer from policy failures.
However, many of the export-boosting efforts of governments are not di-
rected to eliminate market failures but to conceal policy failures. These
measures may help companies in the short run, but not in the long run.24
Therefore, market liberalization is the most important factor to boost in-
ternational business and trade. It opens market opportunities in domestic
as well as in foreign markets. Liberalization should focus on removing or
reducing
• legal and procedural barriers,
• tariff- and non-tariff barriers to goods and capital flows,
• double taxation of profits,
• exchange rate controls.
Governments which are reluctant to promote general liberalization can
start with a limited and controlled experiment. They can establish special
areas where companies are allowed to do business as they like. Free
Economic Zones provide companies with an ideal environment for cross-
border operations. Beyond liberalization, private industrial parks can of-
fer services which allow to overcome market imperfections.












In the first instance, virtually by definition, governments have to take re-
sponsibility for correcting market failures, mainly by making monopolized
markets contestable, by preventing environmental damages and by ini-
tiating the provision of public infrastructure. Second, they have to avoid
policy failures. Third, government responsibility with respect to market25
imperfections, however, is difficult to define. In principle, market imper-
fections give signals to private agents for benefits to be realized and in
many cases, private solutions make imperfections disappear. However,
private initiative may fail to emerge or it may take too long to produce a
workable solution. Then governments may consider intervening with de-
liberately designed measures. In this respect, eastern Germany can
serve as an example what a government can do.
In developing a general framework, the rules established by the OECD
and WTO are highly useful steps to begin with. Actually, they do not re-
quire comprehensive and irreversible liberalization. Rather, they are es-
tablished as a political compromise which sets the minimal standard for
all countries eager to respond successfully to global competition. Once
transformation economies succeed in unleashing the "animal spirit of
entrepreneurship" [The Economist 1997] they may find it compelling to
even go beyond the OECD and WTO standards, such as to move from
the minimal to the optimal degree of liberalization.26
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